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THE REGULATION OF COMPETITION IN
UNITED STATES DOMESTIC AIR
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Assistant Director of Research, The Transportation Center at
Northwestern University.
INTRODUCTION

T is the purpose of this paper to discuss the role played by controlled
competition in the growth and development of the commercial
air transportation system of the United States. Though limited in scope
to consideration of the economic regulation of domestic air carriers
deriving the bulk of their revenues from the transportation of persons
and mail, most of what is said is quite applicable to the federal government's policy towards American-flag overseas carriers as well as to the
several domestic air cargo operators.
The commercial air transportation industry, at least as much as
any other American industry, owes its birth and development to specific
governmental policies and federal action. Therefore, any discussion
such as this can best proceed from a brief recounting of the early history
of the industry, with emphasis on the legislation and governmental
policies which have governed that history. This is undertaken in Part I.
Part II is devoted to a detailed discussion of the provisions and
mandates of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. In detailing these provisions, interest is centered upon those which pertain, both directly and
indirectly, to the economic regulation of air carriers and to competitive
practices. Those provisions pertaining solely to the organizational and
"housekeeping" responsibilities of the Civil Aeronautics Board and the
Civil Aeronautics Administration, as well as those promulgating standards of safety, will be excluded from consideration here.
Part III is concerned with the general attitude of the Board towards
the maintenance of competition as an objective of policy and as one
of the several principal requirements placed upon it by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. The period covered terminates with July 1, 1957,
and emphasis is greatest with respect to the Board's more recent attitudes towards competition.
Part IV examines several particularly pressing present-day problems
* This article is the result of work carried out at the Massachusetts Institute

of Technology and the Transportation Center at Northwestern University. Much
of the material was developed in connection with a current study underway at the

Transportation Center concerning the role of the Civil Aeronautics Board in the
development of the American air transportation system.
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facing the Board and discusses them in relation to the Board's responsibilities with respect to the current state of development of the industry.
Finally, there is a brief summary of conclusions.
(Part IV and a Summary will be published in a subsequent issue of
this Journal.)
I.
EARLY ECONOMIC HISTORY OF UNITED STATES

COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORTATION

Prior to 1925, there was virtually no commercial air transportation
activity in the United States chiefly because it was not possible to conduct such operations on a sound or profitable basis. Therefore, in 1925
the Congress, recognizing the potentialities and desirability of having
an American air transportation industry, passed the Kelly Air Mail
Act authorizing the Post Office Department to contract for the transportation of mail by air.
As originally passed, the Kelly Act provided only for short-term
contracts (which were usually let on competitive bid), and it forbade
any payment to carriers in excess of eighty per cent of the receipts
derived from the sale of air mail postage. There being insufficient
response to such proposals, in 1926 the Kelly Act was amended to permit longer-term contracts to be negotiated. For the first time, subsidy
payments to carriers were authorized in the form of increased remuneration for mail transported. With these changes in effect, in 1927 all
domestic air mail first became transported in commercial rather than
military aircraft. Concurrently, the airlines were made better able to
attract the venture capital so vital to their future growth.
However, the Kelly Act, both before and after being amended, did
not require the Post Office Department in awarding contracts to ascertain the requirements of the public convenience and necessity with
respect to the service to be provided, nor did it require consideration
of the low bidder's fitness or ability to perform. There were no means
provided for the development of a sound route pattern; no protection
was afforded a Post Office contractor from the competition of a parallel non-mail carrier or from unfair or predatory competitive practices.
The period of the late 1920's was characterized by a large number of mergers in the aviation industry. These mergers resulted
from efforts to strengthen positions and to gain some protection from
sharp competitive practices and also from growing public stock market
speculation and the zeal of promoters. This trend towards integration
was further aggravated by the stock market crash of 1929 as the weak
components of the industry were absorbed by the strong. By 1933,
virtually no firms remained active in commercial air transportation
that were not connected with one of the three principal controlling
groups in the aviation industry.
The first of these combines was the United Aircraft and Transport
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Corporation which owned or controlled nineteen subsidiaries engaged
in every phase of aviation. In 1933, the Corporation's flying subsidiaries
collected about one-third of all air mail payments. The second dominant group was the Aviation Corporation of Delaware (the "Cord
Combination") which at its peak had about eighty satellites including
Pan American Airways Corporation, Stinson Aircraft Corporation,
Waco Aircraft Company and American Airways, Incorporated. As of
1933, the air transportation operations of the Cord Combination attracted more than one-quarter of all federal air mail payments. The
last of the triumverate was the General Motors-North American combine which had substantial interest in and control of the Bendix Aviation Corporation, Eastern Air Transport, Incorporated, Western Air
Express Company, Transcontinental and Western Air, Incorporated,
Curtiss-Wright Corporation and the Sperry Corporation, among others.
The flying components of this group received about one-third of all
1934 air mail payments.
These three giants together were receiving more than ninety per
cent of all air mail payments. This is a good index of the degree to
which they permeated the commercial air transportation scene and
indicates how easy it was for them to join cooperatively in nullifying
the intentions of the system of competitive bidding, to the point where
air mail compensation became unnecessarily high. A Congressional
investigation disclosed this state of affairs early in 1934 and also uncovered collusion between the Postmaster General and the three combines. As a result, in February, 1934, all domestic air mail contracts
were cancelled.
Throughout the 1925-1934 period, the transportation of passengers,
air express, and cargo rose steadily and sharply, making the revenue
derived from such services increasingly important to the carriers. So
far we have been discussing mostly the air mail portion of total airline
revenues, because it had the federal subsidy locked into it and because
this income was the largest part of the total. Its acquisition was the
object of most of whatever competition had been displayed within the
industry.
With the abrogation of all air mail contracts, the air carriers were
deprived of an indispensable source of revenue and the stability which
it afforded. Consequently, Congress enacted the Air Mail Act of 1934
in June of that year. This Act retained the competitive bid feature of
earlier legislation, but for the first time set forth certain standards of
conduct for airline management which were to be prerequisites to the
award of an air mail contract. In brief, all inter-corporate and personal
relationships between firms in the aviation industry had to be severed
and each airline had to become independent of all others and of any
person involved in the earlier collusive practices as well.
The 1934 Act, like the earlier, original Kelly Act of 1925, permitted the Post Office Department (now acting through the Interstate
Commerce Commision rather than directly) to negotiate only short-
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term contracts with the carriers. Again, the effect of this provision was
adverse to the airlines, as uncertainty of tenure of an air mail contract
made it difficult for them to plan expansions and to raise capital in a
market already wary of the industry's management practices. Thus
too much, or rather too frequent, exposure to competition contributed
to the precarious position in which the airlines found themselves
following passage of the 1934 Act.
During the period 1934-1938, two factors that indicated revision of
the 1934 Act had become mandatory were brought forcefully to the
attention of the government and the nation. First, it became increasingly obvious that financial stability was a prime requisite to the conduct of a sustained, safe air transport operation. Second, and perhaps
an even more compelling factor, was the recognition that a sound and
vital commercial air transportation industry was necessary for purposes
of national security and defense. As the rumblings from Europe and
the Far East became more ominous, pressures intensified. The arguments ran that a sound air transport industry was itself vitally important, but that such an industry would also provide a great stimulus for
the expansion of the equally necessary aircraft manufacturing industry.
So it was that the Congress recognized the desirability of lessening
the competitive pressures on the airlines and determined to alleviate
the existing conditions through new legislation. In reporting the bill
that became the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, the Senate Committee
on Commerce stated:
Competition among air carriers is being carried to an extreme,
which tends to jeopardize the financial status of the air carriers
and to jeopardize and render unsafe a transportation service appropriate to the needs of commerce and required in the public interest,
in the interests of the postal service, and of the national defense.
Since the 1938 Act still governs the regulation and conduct of American commercial air transportation, it is necessary to examine its provisions in some detail.
II.
THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD AND THE CIVIL
AERONAUTICS

ACT OF

1938

As originally passed, the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 established
a Civil Aeronautics Authority which was to administer all the provisions of the Act. In 1940, however, by administrative change, there
were set up two separate units with responsibilities for administering
different parts of the Act. The Civil Aeronautics Board was established
as an independent agency and was made responsible for the regulation
and control of the air transportation industry. Therefore, the remainder of this paper makes no further reference to the Civil Aeronautics
Administration of the Department of Commerce which assumed those
duties (largely of an administrative nature) not vested in the Board.
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In discharging its responsibilities towards civil aviation, the Civil
Aeronautics Board is guided first by the Declaration of Policy contained
in the General Provisions of the 1938 Act:
In the exercise and performance of its powers and duties under this
Act, the Authority shall consider the following, among other things,
as being in the public interest, and in accordance with the public
convenience and necessity(a) The encouragement and development of an air-transportation system properly adapted to the present and future needs of
the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the
Postal Service, and of the national defense;
(b) The regulation of air transportation in such manner as to
recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of, assure the highest degree of safety in, and foster sound economic conditions in,
such transportation, and to improve the relations between, and coordinate transportation by, air carriers;
(c)The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service
by air carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive
competitive practices;
(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound
development of an air-transportation system properly adapted to
the needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United
States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense;
(e)The regulation of air commerce in such manner as to best
promote its development and safety; and
(f) The encouragement and development of civil aeronautics.1
This Declaration of Policy thus places two fundamental responsibilities
upon the Board: (1) the regulation of air carriers and (2) the maximum promotion of progress in air transport consistent with its longterm development. More about methods for carrying out these objectives is indicated in Title IV of the Act, "Air Carrier Economic
Regulation."
The promotional aspects of the program are to be conducted
through three principal devices. The first is the issuance of certificates
of public convenience and necessity to applicants who are found to be
"fit, willing and able to perform such transportation properly . . .and

(upon a finding) that such transportation is required by the public
convenience and necessity. ' 2 While the issuance of a certificate of
public convenience and necessity is itself not considered to be promotional in character in other fields of transportation, it must be so
construed in the air transportation field because such a certificate usually carries with it the authority to transport mail, the payment for
which constitutes the second promotional device employed by the
Board.3
1 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Title I, Section 2, (49 U.S.C. 402).

21bid., Title IV, Section 401 (d) (1), (49 U.S.C. 481).
8 In confirmation of the fact that a certificate is a promotional device, the Board
recognizes that the government-granted operating authority has value in and of
itself and, on occasion, the Board has permitted certificates to be sold by one
carrier to another.
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Section 406 (b) (49 U.S.C. 486) contains the elements of ratemaking to be used in determining each certificated carrier's remuneration for the transportation of mail. This section authorizes the Board
to "fix different rates for different air carriers or classes of air carriers,
and different classes of service." In determining such rates, the Board
is to consider, among other factors,
• .. the need of each such air carrier for compensation for the

transportation of mail sufficient to insure the performance of such
service, and, together with all other revenue of the air carrier, to
enable such air carrier under honest, economical and efficient management, to maintain and continue the development of air transportation to the extent and of the character and quality required
for the commerce4 of the United States, the Postal Service, and the
national defense.
The foregoing passage, of course, is that which authorizes the federal
subsidization of air transport activities. Since the subsidy device has
been the most important single means of fostering the development of
commercial air transportation in the United States, it will frequently
enter the discussion in later parts of this paper.
The third means of promotion available to the Board is found in
Section 416 (b). This section authorizes the Board to exempt an air
carrier from certain of the requirements of Title IV of the Act where
appropriate "by reason of the limited extent of, or unusual circum5
stances affecting, the operations of any such air carrier." Prior to
World War II there was little promotional activity pursuant to this
section. But since the war, the Board has, under these provisions,
authorized the conduct of certain interstate air transport operations,
the most notable being through the issuance of "letters of registration"
to irregular or supplemental (non-scheduled) air carriers. 6 The promotional character of the granting of exemptions to Title IV of the
Act lies in the fact that without such exemptions only certificated air
common carriers could operate in interstate commerce. Thus, while
letters of registration have not permitted the exempted carriers to transport mail or to receive a federal subsidy, they have enabled them to
conduct more or less limited operations in a field7 of transportation
which would be inviolate without such exemption.
Other important regulatory provisions of Title IV of the Act
prohibit air carriers subject to this title from consolidating with, merging with, or acquiring control of other air carriers, other common
carriers, or any firms engaged in any other phase of the transportation
industry without approval of the Board. Further, the Board
4ibid., Title IV, Section 406 (b) (49 U.S.C. 486).
5 Ibid., Title IV, Section 416 (b) (49 U.S.C. 496).
6 The issuance and conditions of issue of letters of registration to Irregular
Air Carriers, Alaskan Air Carriers, Non-certificated Cargo Carriers, Air Freight
Forwarders and Air Taxi Operators are governed by Parts 291 through 298 of the
Economic Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board.
7 The Board's regulation and control of these irregular or supplemental carriers is discussed in detail in a subsequent section of this paper.
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• . . shall not approve any consolidation, merger, purchase, lease,
operating contract, or acquisition of control which would result in
creating a monopoly or monopolies and thereby restrain competition
or jeopardize another air carrier. ... 8
Also, there is strict prohibition of any interlocking relationships be-

tween an air carrier and any person engaged in any phase of aeronautics,
except as approved by the Board.9
The Board has been given the authority to "investigate and determine whether any air carrier ...

has been or is engaged in unfair or

deceptive practices or unfair methods of competition in air transportation" and, if so, it may issue a cease and desist order.10 Every air
carrier must file with the Board any contract or agreement with another
air carrier
•.. for pooling or apportioning earnings, losses, traffic, service or
equipment, or relating to the establishment of transportation rates,
fares, charges, or classifications, or for preserving and improving
safety, economy, and efficiency of operation, or for controlling,
regulating, preventing, or otherwise eliminating destructive, oppressive or wasteful competition, or for regulating stops, schedules, and
character of service, or for other cooperative working arrangements. The (Board) shall . . . disapprove any such contract or
agreement . . . that it finds to be adverse to the public interest,
or in violation of this Act."
Finally, in a provision which has come to be more and more common
where transportation and public utility regulation are concerned, the
Act protects air carriers from anti-trust prosecution insofar as their
conduct is governed by a Board order issued under Sections 408, 409
2
or 412 of the Act.'
Comparison of the regulatory and promotional provisions of the
Act show clearly that they are not entirely mutually compatible in all
circumstances. For example, the subsidy provision of the Act makes it
imperative that competition be kept to a comparatively low level if
federal support payments are not to be "excessive." That is, as long as
a carrier is below the optimum level of operations, and is therefore
above minimum cost, the maintenance of competition may require
subsidy. Furthermore, even the maximum attainable profit may be
negative or below an "adequate" level of earnings, thus indicating the
need for subsidy even if the carrier operates at or near its minimum
cost level. In general, if competition reduced airline earnings below
the "adequate" level (however defined by the Board), and thereby
restricted expansion and necessitated subsidy, such competition would
exact the subsidy as its price. Therefore, there is a basic conflict
between competition and other aims and purposes of the Act. (It
should be noted, however, that the conflict may be dissolved if airlines'
S Ibid., Title IV, Section 408 (49 U.S.C. 488).
9 Ibid. Title IV, Section 409 (49 U.S.C. 489).
10Ibid., Title IV, Section 411 (49 U.S.C. 491).
11 Ibid., Title IV, Section 412 (49 U.S.C. 492).
12 Ibid., Title IV, Section 414 (49 U.S.C. 494).
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earnings would even under competition approach "adequacy.") The
earlier system of periodic competitive bidding for particular air mail
routes could in no way be made compatible with the objective of the
long-run development of the industry and of sound route patterns.
Therefore, under the Act's "Grandfather Clause," certificates of convenience and necessity were first granted to operators who had been
active over their particular routes for a specified period of time prior
to the effective date of the Act. Only after such certificates had been
issued could authorizations for additional or new services be considered. This is the situation with which the Board was faced when it first
undertook to regulate and promote the development of commercial air
transportation under the terms of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.
III.
COMPETITION AND GENERAL BOARD POLICY

The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, as discussed above, left the
Board with a difficult task because of its often conflicting mandates to
foster competition in commercial air transportation while at the same
time promoting its rapid growth and development. It is therefore
desirable to examine the Board's general policies and declarations to
determine what weight has been placed upon the former requirement
in the face of the inevitable conflicts that arose.
Beginning with the certificated passenger-carrying domestic airlines,
it is necessary to distinguish between two classes of carriers exactly as
the Board has done for purposes of regulation and administration.
There are, first, the certificated trunkline carriers and, second, the
certificated local service carriers. The Board has placed each certificated carrier in one of these two categories largely on the basis of
function and character of service performed. However, the operations
of some of the carriers in each group have often left little to distinguish
between them on this basis.13 Be that as it may, for most purposes,
including those of this paper, it is sufficient to think of the trunkline
carriers as operating on a larger scale and over greater distances than
do the local service carriers whose operations are confined to a comparatively small geographic area in which they serve many points both
large and small.
Because of the authorization to carry mail (and thereby receive a
subsidy) contained in these air carriers' certificates of convenience and
necessity, the Board has always declared itself, in accordance with the
Act, to be administering the program so that the public derives the
maximum benefit from each subsidy dollar spent. This has meant that
18 For example, before 1956 there was little difference in the function or character of the operations by which to distinguish between Northeast Airlines and
Piedmont Airlines, the former the smallest of the trunk lines and the latter the
largest of local service carriers. After the effects of all recent decisions "take hold,"
it is expected and hoped (particularly by the Board) that a dichotomy between
subsidized and un-subsidized carriers will be the same thing as dividing the carrier
into the trunk and local service categories.
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some restriction on competition has been necessary to keep the subsidy
payments at a "reasonable" level. As something of a quid pro quo for
such protection from competition, the certificated carriers have had to
submit themselves to the more or less rigid regulation of their fare
structures, management practices, qualities of service, etc. Thus the
certificated carriers have in a very real sense been treated as public
utilities, at least as far as their regulation by the Board is concerned.
However, the regulation of the certificated air carriers has become
much more complex than is usually true in the case of the more orthodox public utilities such as power and communications companies.
This is a result of the Act's commandments that the Board must also
foster competition in the air transportation field and also prevent
monopolies from being created.14 Such positive and complicating
requirements are seldom, if ever, so directly placed upon the regulators
of the traditional public utilities. Another complicating Congressional
mandate makes the Board responsible for the development of the
industry even while regulating and subsidizing it. This latter provision
is an even more unique feature of the Civil Aeronautics Act.
With respect to the certificated air carriers, competition can take
several forms, each of which the Board is empowered in some measure
to control and each of which the Board must always be prepared to
regulate. The principal sources of such competition, both actual and
potential, for each certificated air carrier are as follows: (1) applicants
for air carrier certificates of public convenience and necessity, (2)
other active certificated air carriers, (3) irregular or supplemental
(non-scheduled, non-certificated) air carriers and (4) carriers engaged
in other modes of transportation.
There were eighteen air carriers certificated by the Board in 1938
as soon as the Act became effective. All received their certificates in
accordance with the "Grandfather Clause" contained in the Act. Of
these original eighteen, only twelve remain operative today. They
alone comprise the ranks of the certificated trunkline passenger carriers,
as no certificates have been issued to new carriers for the performance
of trunkline passenger service since the passage of the Act. Prior to
and during World War II, there were few applications for certificates
of convenience and necessity by would-be entrants into the industry.15
The applications that were made were turned down most often for
want of a finding that the applicant was "fit, willing and able," coupled
with an expression that the number of carriers already certificated was
sufficient to afford the competition necessary for the development of
the industry and was adequate to insure against undue monopolization.
Further, it was pointed out in several decisions that the strengthening
14 Ibid., Title IV, Section 408 (b) (49 U.S.C. 488).
15 Prior to 1945, almost all applications for certificates by potential entrants
were for services which would be characterized as trunkline service. Until after
the War, the Board did not find it necessary to make any distinction between trunk-

line and local service certificated carriers because, except for one operation, all the
carriers up to that time were performing what was thought to be the former type

of service.
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of the smaller existing trunkline carriers, instead of certificating new\
ones, would increase the former's ability to compete in the industry,
make for improved service to the public and lower the carrier's subsidy\
requirement by helping it along the road to self-sufficiency.'"
Since the close of World War II, applications for new certificates
of convenience and necessity have come from two principal sources:
(1) from those desirous of performing a local service type of operation
and (2) from irregular air carriers wanting to graduate to regularly
scheduled operations. Applicants in the former group have acted in
response to a policy of the Board enunciated in its war-time report
following an "Investigation of Local, Feeder and Pick-up Air Service."
This report stated, in effect, that the Board was prepared to encourage
and assist (through the granting of the necessary certificates and subsidies) in the establishment of air carriers to perform services of a
strictly local and feeder-line character.' 7 Those certificates which were
originally issued were written so as to restrict severely the local service
carriers' competition with trunkline carriers and with each other.18
This was done for the protection of both the trunkline carriers and
the local service operators. In this regard, the thwarting of competition
has usually been accomplished by writing into the local service certificates prohibitions against non-stop and skip-stop operations in cases
where it was not possible to give the right to operate over a given route
segment (or segments) to one or the other type of carrier alone. 19 In
the Board's own phraseology,
We are of the general opinion that feeder service should seldom
if ever be competitive. The traffic potential is so limited in most
feeder territory that duplicate operations by two or more carriers
can seldom if ever be economical. We have reached the conclusion
that in general where a feeder carrier's route is duplicated by a
trunkline carrier and such route is not necessary to the trunkline
carrier's operation, then such route should be served by the feeder
carrier alone. Conversely, where a route is a necessary and integral
part of a trunkline carrier's system and essential to its economical
operation, then such route should not be served by a feeder carrier.
Where two feeder carriers substantially duplicate service between
certain communities, then
the feeder routes should be adjusted to
20
avoid such duplication.
'6 For an important and typical decision along this line, see Delta Air Corporation, et al.-Additional Service to Atlanta and Birmingham, (1941), (2 CAB
447).
'7 Investigation of Local, Feeder and Pick-up Air Service, (1944), (6 CAB 1).
The report made it clear that the certificates to be issued would be temporary in
character because of the experimental nature of the operations.
18 This is still largely true today. For exceptions to this, however, see below,
pp. 423-426.
19 All local service certificates contain some non-stop and skip-stop restrictions.
Where the local service carrier is unavoidably in competition with a trunk-line
carrier, this assures that the former's service will be inferior to that of the latter
over the common portion of the route. Further, such certificate restrictions keep
the local service carrier from wandering into the trunk-line field contrary to the
Board's intention and policy. For recent decisions where the Board has modified
its views (and some carriers' certificates) to permit more inter-carrier competition
where
20 local service airlines are concerned, see page 423 below.
Southwest Airways Company, Pioneer Airlines, Incorporated, and TransTexas Airways Show Cause Order, (Order Serial No. E-2680), April 4, 1949.
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. With respect to the second group of applicants in the post-war
period, the irregular (or supplemental) air carriers, the Board has thus
far steadfastly refused to grant certificates of convenience and necessity
to any one of them to cover domestic passenger operations. In 1955,
however, the Board broadened the scope of their permissible operations
and expressed the view that these carriers

...

represent a significant

part of our air transport system, and that our (the Board's) policy
towards them should be directed toward their survival and continued
healthy growth, subject to the overall objectives of our Act and a
proper relationship to our certificated air carrier system.' '21 While a
more detailed discussion of the Board's attitude towards the competitive operations and practices of non-certificated carriers will be undertaken in a later section of this paper, it should be stated at this point
that notwithstanding the Board's explicitly expressed interest in fostering the growth and development of the non-certificated segment of
the industry, these carriers have, with few exceptions, been very ineffectively competitive with the services of certificated carriers in the recent
past.2

2

(The remainder of this chapter, which discusses the Board's

general attitudes towards competition, will therefore proceed without
further reference to the irregular or supplemental carriers.)
In considering the modification, suspension or revocation of the
certificates of public convenience and necessity of existing carriers, the
Board has constantly been faced with the problem of regulating competition in such a manner as to meet the Act's requirement that the
air transportation industry be developed, that the needs of commerce,
the Postal Service and the national defense be met and that subsidy
payments be kept to a "reasonable" level. Because of the inevitably
unique character of each case calling for such a decision by the Board,
it is extremely difficult to predict with any degree of certainty the
Board's decisions in most cases brought before it.23 Nevertheless, the
Board contends that there are several major threads of policy which
run through most, if not all, of its decisions. It is therefore an objective
of the remaining portions of this paper to determine in a general way
just how consistent the Board has been in regulating competition
between the certificated air carriers.
In response to several early applications by established certificated
carriers for the performance of additional, competitive services, the
21 Large Irregular Air Carrier Investigation (Order Serial No. E-9744), November 15, 1955. CCH Aviation Law Reporter Par. 21,879.01.
22 By far the most effective competitor among the irregular carriers was the
Trans-American combine (formerly North American Airlines). This operation,
which was conducted very successfully (from the standpoint of attracting passengers and showing profits) was finally terminated, after long attempts on the
Board's part to do so, with a 1957 decision of the United States Supreme Court.

This whole episode is discussed in detail in Part IV below.

23 The author recognizes that if there were more predictability in over-all
judicial and quasi-judicial systems, there would be much less call for adjudication

than there now is. It is the intention here to point out, however, that it is in part

because of the complicating and contradictory requirements placed upon the Board
by the Act that Board decisions are much more difficult to predict and predications
more likely to be upset than perhaps in any other judicial or quasi-judicial proceed-

ings in the United States.
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Board in 1943 stated firmly that the Act implies the desirability of
competition only when such competition is neither "destructive nor
uneconomical" in nature. The decision further states that because
competition itself presents an incentive to improved service and technological development, there is a strong, though inconclusive, presumption in favor of competition on routes offering sufficient traffic
to support competing services without an unreasonable increase of
total operating costs. 24 This pronouncement, of course, contains several

qualifications which will perhaps always require a Board decision to
be resolved. The most important point in such cases has probably
been the determination in each case as to what constitutes an unreasonable increase of total operating costs. This, in effect, has tied the
Board down to determining whether, in each case, the increase in
costs resulting from the introduction or increase of competition will
be offset by the improved service and further development of the
industry that also results. And, too, because any operating losses may
have to be made up from the public treasury in accordance with the
Board's recommendations, the Board has an additional incentive-and
responsibility-to weigh the various factors with extreme care.
An example of the Board's operation under the general policy of
the Additional North-South CaliforniaServices decision is found in a
1944 decision in which it was decided not to award a route to an
applicant because of the resulting inevitable diversion of traffic from
another carrier, notwithstanding the public benefit in the form of
improved service that might also result from the increased competition.
The Board stated that to permit such competition would weaken the
original carrier's position as a competitor in its section of the country
and would cause it to become more dependent upon air mail payment
and subsidy for its continued operation. This was deemed to be contrary to Section 2 of the Act2 5 which requires the Board to provide for
competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound development
of our national air transportation system and to foster sound economic
conditions in air transportation.

26

24 Transcontinental and Western Air, Incorporated et al., Additional NorthSouth California Services (Supplemental Opinion), (1943), (4 CAB 373). This
decision also observes that, because of Congress' failure to lay down definite rules
or formulas for determining a specific and correct measure of competition, there
is perhaps no way to formulate a general rule to substitute for the Board's discretionary judgment. See also Northeast Airlines, Incorporated et al., Additional
Service to Boston, (1944), (4 CAB 686).
25 See p. 414 above.
26 Western Air Lines, Incorporatedet al., Denver-Los Angeles Service, (1944),
(6 CAB 199). In an important decision on appeal from the Board's judgment in
this case, the Federal District Court found the Board to be acting within its power
in granting the application of one carrier rather than another on grounds that
the public interest represented by the economic and competitive value of the
successful applicant to our national air transportation system outweighed the
public interest represented by the convenience of a large number of travelers which
would result had the other carrier's application been approved. United Air Lines,
Incorporated v. Civil Aeronautics Board et al., (1946), (155 F. 2d 169).
Note also that in selecting from among several carriers to perform a new or
competing service, the Board is not required by the Act to award the service so as
to equalize the size or opportunities of the various air carriers. Northwest Airlines,

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

Again in 1946, in response to the application of a regional trunkline carrier for a certificate amendment to permit an extension of
service in competition with a larger, transcontinental carrier, the Board
stated:
The principle of strengthening a small carrier by authorizing an
extension of its system in order to permit it to compete effectively
with existing services has its converse in the principle of safeguarding an existing service from unique impairment by another
27
carrier.
Through the War, as has previously been pointed out, all certificated air carriers were performing (in greater or lesser degree) what
can be designated as trunkline services. 28 After the War, the Board's
announced policy of backing experiments in local service air transportation led to the certification of a number of new air carriers. As
mentioned above, competition between local service and trunkline
carriers has been effectively minimized for the most part as it was the
Board's intention to do. The Board's purpose behind this seems to
have been four-fold. First, the Board, by supporting the experiment,
was attempting to determine the demand for strictly local air service
throughout the United States. It therefore granted each local service
carrier a spatial monopoly on air transportation whenever possible in
29
all but the larger, terminal communities along its routes.
Second, the local service operations were to be strictly experimental
in character, with the carriers holding only temporary certificates that
could be revoked or allowed to lapse, as appropriate, if the trial proved
the infeasibility of the project. By keeping the local service carriers
out of competition with the permanently certificated trunkline operators, the Board thereby minimized the impact on the planning and
steady development of the latter group from the standpoint of both
the introduction of local service operations and from the possibility
of curtailment, should the experiment fail.3 0
Third, the Board knew full well that because of the high-cost nature
of local service operations, it would have to subsidize the new carriers
heavily, at least in the beginning. By restricting competition, the Board
Incorporated et al., Chicago-Milwaukee-New York Service, (1944), (6 CAB 217).
But where the extension of a route will strengthen a small carrier materially by
providing access to important traffic-producing communities, such extension may
be in consonance with the Board's duty to encourage and develop a sound air
transportation system through the issuance of a certificate of public convenience
and necessity, all other things considered. Colonial Airlines, Incorporated et al.,
Atlantic Seaboard Operation (Supplemental Opinion), (1944), (4 CAB 552).
27 West Coast Case, (1946), (6 CAB 970). A similar statement is to be found
in the Board's opinion in the New England Case, (1946), (7 CAB 27).
28 There is one exception to this statement: Pioneer Air Lines, Incorporated
was certificated in 1943 and became the first of the class of certificated air carriers
designated formally at the close of the War as Local Service Carriers.
29 For a direct statement of the Board as to how it expected to accomplish this
goal, see the quotation from Board Order Serial Number E-2680 to he found on
page 419 above.
Also see Bonanza Air Lines, Incorporated-Transcontinentaland Western Air,
Incorporated,Route Authorization Transfer Case, (1949), (10 CAB 893).
30 That the Board recognized the possibility that the experiment might fail is
most interesting. Also to be noted is the fact that the Board established no criteria
by which to judge "failure."
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minimized the need for subsidy on the part of the local service carriers.
In addition, since the trunkline carriers were also on subsidy, the
introduction of local service carriers on a non-competitive basis would
not increase the former carrier group's need for financial aid.3 '
Finally, the local service type of operation was recognized by the
Board as being highly specialized in character and as requiring the
full-time attention of the operator if the cost to the government was
to be kept within reasonable limits and if the service area's full traffic
potential was to be realized. Part of this recognition stemmed from the
fact that the local service operator would be faced with the most intense
kind of competition from well-entrenched surface carriers and would
need little further stimulus to keep his organization in trim.
While local service carrier certificates of convenience and necessity
have been converted-at least in part-to permanent grants of operating
authority in the past several years,3 2 the Board is still protecting and
strengthening these carriers much as it has always done.
In short, when making route awards involving only local service
carriers, the Board has made its decisions on bases frequently similar
to those used in choosing between several trunk carrier applicants for
the same authorization. On many occasions, of course, the fact is cited
that local service operations are not generally self-sufficient and therefore require subsidy. This can more or less significantly affect the
choice of a carrier for a local service award where the minimization of
subsidy needs is deemed of sufficient importance. Furthermore, in few
cases has the Board departed from its general 33policy of authorizing only
one local service carrier over a specific route.
31 Not only were the local service carriers' operations seen as not hurting the
trunkline group, their introduction was expected to increase trunkline traffic by
creating air-mindedness in the hinterlands and by bringing passengers into terminal
airports for connections with trunkline flights. See Southwest Airways Company
Renewal Case-United Suspension Case, (1952), (15 CAB 61).
32 As previously noted, originally all local service certificates of convenience
and necessity were issued on a temporary basis, i.e., for a stated number of years.
This was in explicit recognition that the type of service to be rendered thereunder
was experimental in nature. While the Board at that time did not indicate precisely
what it would look for in determining when such operations were to be up-graded
from "experiments" to a firmer footing, there was at least a presumption that
economic self-sufficiency (or the close approach thereto) would be one of the criteria
to be used. It is interesting to note in passing that the Board has now made permanent most local service carrier certificates without having this part of the industry
even remotely approach economic independence (of the Federal treasury). Without
doubt, political pressures, the carrier needs for long-term financing through which
they can acquire new equipment, and other similar considerations have prompted
the recent Board actions solidifying the status of the local service carrier. But it
would nonetheless be most interesting to examine in greater detail the earliest view
of the local service type of air transportation in order to compare it with the pattern that now seems to be emerging.
33 Exceptions are made only in what the Board considers to be "special" cases.
For example, in the Erie-DetroitService Case, Dkt. 6927, (Order Number E-10625),
September 20, 1956. CCII Aviation Law Reporter, Paragraph 21,991, duplicate service by Mohawk Airlines and Allegheny Airlines was authorized by the Board
between 'Erie, Pennsylvania and Detroit, Michigan. In promoting duplicate service
the Board held that the public benefits would outweigh any disadvantages which
might occur. It was pointed out that duplication would occur only on the ErieDetroit portion of each carrier's routes and that this limited amount of duplication
was seen as not violating the Board's policy of limiting subsidized local service for
a given market to a single local service carrier.
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Overall, the Board has followed a continuing policy of granting
route extensions and related authorizations to local service carriers in
the hope that it will make them better able to attain economic selfsufficiency and at the same time offer improved service to the traveling
public. 4 Primary considerations for the Board remain the effects of
each authorization on the subsidy needs of the carrier, with the result
that, other things being equal, a new authorization goes to the carrier
which can provide the service for the smallest addition to its subsidy
bill, or, presumably, for the largest decrease in existing subsidy payments. Public benefit to be derived, integration of a route authorization with a carrier's existing route structure, "need" for the additional
route extension, and type and quality of service the carrier is capable
of performing all come in for mention; but, by and large, subsidy
considerations are seen as governing.
In several cases involving route authorizations where the applicants
were both trunkline and local service carriers the Board has followed
a' policy of authorizing local service carriers where the routes were
determined to be mainly of a "local service nature." This has even
been true in certain cases where the Board has felt that the cost to the
government may be greater if a local service carrier is authorized
rather than a trunkline, but that local service operation should nonetheless be permitted because it alone would provide increased and
improved service and best develop the market. The local service carrier
is still expected to meet the needs of the smaller communities more
adequately and thus be able to generate the maximum traffic over
the routes.35
In at least two unique decisions in the recent past the Board has
placed a local service carrier in competition with a trunk carrier. In
the Southwest Airways Renewal Case,30 various points in California
34See Quad Cities-Twin Cities Case, Dkt. 7192, (Order Serial Number
E-11067), February 27, 1957. CCII Aviation Law Reporter, Pragraph 22,028. Also
Erie-Detroit Service Case, Supplemental opinion on Reconsideration, Dkt. 6927,
(Order Serial Number E-11010), February 6, 1957. CCII Aviation Law Reporter,
Paragraph 22,020. Lima-Detroit Service Case, Dkt. 7489, (Order Serial Number
E-10960), January 18, 1957. CCII Aviation Law Reporter, Paragraph 22,001.
35 See Route No. 106 Renewal Case Supplemental Opinion, Dkt. 6050, (Order
Serial Number E-9292), June 10, 1955. CCII Aviation Law Reporter, Paragraph
21,844: Ozark Certificate Renewal Case-Supplemental Opinion, Dkt. 5988, (Order
Serial Number E-9292), June 10, 1955. CCH Aviation Law Reporter, Paragraph
21,844: Panama City, Florida-AtlantaInvestigation, Dkt. 7233, (Order Serial No.
E-10332), May 29, 1956. CCH Aviation Law Reporter, Paragraph 21,969.01. Also
American Airlines, Inc.-Chicago-Detroit Route 7 Local Service Case, Dkt. 6411
et al, (Order Serial No. E-8975), February 28, 1955. CCH Aviation Law Reporter,
Paragraph 21,804. This latter case, among others, illustrates that the trunklines
frequently are not unhappy to relinquish parts of their route structure to local
service carriers when the route is not profitable for the former. American Airlines
volunteered to give up its several intermediate points between Detroit to Chicago
to a local service airliner in this proceeding. This case also indicates that local service carriers can provide better service for the communities along such routes than
can a carrier which is long-haul oriented. After succeeding to this route North
Central Airlines offered much more frequency to the points served than had American-partly by using smaller aircraft-and partly because of its ability and inclination to specialize in this type of operation.
86 Southwest Airways Renewal Case, Dkt. 6503, (Order Number E-9592),
September 27, 1955. CCH Aviation Law Reporter, Paragraph 21,872.
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which had been served by Southwest, following suspension of United
Air Lines' rights to serve them, were re-certificated to United to allow
it to offer competitive services. The Board felt that United's restriction
could be removed because these points needed additional service and
because the traffic had become such as to support service both by the
trunkline and the local service carrier. The Board specifically stated:
"... Two new elements, when considered together with the matters
weighed by the Examiner, have inclined us to reinstate United. The
first is the enactment of section 401 (e)(3) of the Act, which may
be taken as reflecting a legislative finding that local service air
carriers are generally past the experimental stage and are to be

recognized as an established part of our national air transportation
system. From this it follows that certain Board actions which were
warranted during the earlier phases of local service carrier evolution may require re-examination to determine whether they are ap-

propriate when the local service carriers'survival is assured. While

suspensions of pre-existing trunkline certification at points served
by local service carriers may still be required for various reasons
in particular cases, such suspensions as are before us now represented at least in part promotional devices to assist the local service
carriers in37 establishing themselves, and were avowedly temporary
in nature.
This statement seems to indicate that since local service carriers are
now to be viewed as a permanent part of the national transportation
scene, changes might be in order in local service authorizations and in
the nature of route restrictions and extensions. It can perhaps be
expected that the Board will now be less prone to "protect" the local
service carrier in view of their new status. But this is not yet certain
and can only be determined with the passage of time.
Another recent decision of the Board in the Syracuse-New York
City Case,38 installed Mohawk Airlines as a competitive carrier to
American Airlines in offering non-stop service over the Syracuse-New
York route segment. It was pointed out by the Board that since American serves this area as part of a transcontinental route, the local haul
nature of the market had largely been neglected and hence required
the authorization of a local service carrier to develop it adequately in
the public interest. For the sake of analytical completeness (and in
fairness to the Board), it is also important to note that the Board did
not view its decision in this case as precedent-setting. In its words:
There has been a great deal of discussion as to whether the Syracuse-New York route should properly be characterized as a typical
local service or trunkline route and whether an award of non-stop
rights to Mohawk would be contrary to the Board's long-standing
policy applicable to local service carriers .... In reaching a decision

in this case we fail to find any need for labeling the Syracuse-New
York route as reserved exclusively for either a local service or a
3s Southwest Airways Renewal Case, CCH Aviation Law Reporter, Paragraph
21,872.03 (italics added).
88 Syracuse-New York City Case, Dkt. 6179, (Order Serial Number E-11173),
March 27, 1957. CCH Aviation Law Reporter, Paragraph 22,035.
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trunkline carrier. Nor do we believe our decision herein should be
viewed as a landmark case which reverses, modifies or changes the
essential characteristics of the local service concept heretofore
developed by the Board.3 9
Turning now to the regulation of competition between trunkline
carriers in the post-war period the Board, as stated above, has generally
held that it has adhered to the policies enunciated by it in previous
periods. However, with this segment of the industry having become
stronger, more mature and economically more sophisticated with the
passage of time, the Board has been faced with specific competitive
problems so complex that earlier causes of action come to take on an
aura of simplicity by comparison.
The maturity of the trunkline carrier group is evidenced in several
ways, each of which complicates the Board's task of promulgating and
rationalizing its regulatory decrees. For example, the subsidy requirements of the trunkline carriers (individually and as a group) have
dropped steadily and sharply in recent years. 40 This makes it more
difficult for the Board to decide competitive issues principally on the
basis of cost to the government, since the Board apparently sees the
possibility that the government may be required to foot the bill of a
competitive action (as a result of a carrier's being forced back onto
the subsidy rolls) as quite remote.
In the recent cases where new competition has been widely authorized between trunk carriers, it is impossible to ascertain the exact role
that the growing independence of the more "successful" trunk carriers
has played in the Board's decisions. But it is obvious from a careful
reading of these decisions, particularly in the light of previous statements of policy, that the background of sustained, subsidy-free performance on the part of many of the trunklines that have now been more
effectively paralleled, has actually had much to do with the fact that
they were paralleled.
The Board's "new" outlook, brought about by changing subsidy
conditions and the increased financial independence and maturity of
the trunk group of carriers, has produced more loosely regulated competition where competition between trunk carriers was at issue. For
example, in the recent past the Board has promulgated a number of
decisions supporting this thesis and having long-run implications for
Board policy as well as far-reaching effects upon the United States air
transportation system. For purposes of discussion and analysis, it is
possible to separate the cases into several general categories: (1) situations where competition between Big Four trunkline (s) and other
trunkline (s) was at issue; (2) cases where competition between two
or more Big Four carriers was at issue; and (3) cases in which compeIbid., Paragraph 22,035.02.
It is anticipated that the close of the government's fiscal year 1958 will find
all of the twelve trunkline carriers off subsidy entirely as far as domestic operations
39
40

are concerned. Indeed, all but one trunk carrier have been unsubsidized for the past
several years. (This is not to say that all trunk carriers save one have shown profits
for each of the past few years.)
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tition between two or more smaller trunklines was the problem. (Of
course, certain of the broader cases require the Board to consider more
than one of these classes of inter-trunk carrier competition.) 41
The Southwest-Northeast Case42 is a typical example of the Board's
most recent view of competition between Big Four and other trunk
airliners. 43 In this decision, where much new and additional competitive air service was authorized between cities in the Northeastern and
Southwestern United States, the Board explicitly cited as its prime
objective in selecting the recipients of the awards the strengthening
of smaller trunklines. In choosing to improve the position of these
smaller trunklines rather than add to (or leave) the route structures
of any of the Big Four carrier parties, the Board said that their actions
would"... so strengthen the smaller trunks as to insure that they will
in the future be able to continue operations without subsidy even
during periods of economic adversity ....

The Board also said"It is vital, in our opinion, to so develop the national air route
structure as to tend to decrease rather than increase the gap
between the relative size of the Big Four carriers and the smaller
trunks."
In further justification of its policy to strengthen the smaller trunks,
the Board stated explicitly that".... to create a greater unbalance in carrier size (would) thereby

adversely affect the ability of the smaller trunks to compete effectively in markets which they serve with the larger carrier. (The
Board believes) that the benefits to be derived from effective competition will be spread to a greater number of cities if the size
disparity between the smaller and larger carriers is reduced. .

.

. To

the extent that we choose a small trunk instead of a Big Four
carrier to provide a needed new service . . .we enlarge the small

carrier's opportunity to render effective competitive service in
other markets which they are already authorized to serve....
And further"As the smaller carriers' route systems are strengthened they will
be in a better position to experiment with the provision of low cost
transportation."
41 The so-called "Big Four" carriers are American, United, TWA and Eastern.
The remaining trunkline carriers are Braniff, Capital, Continental, Delta, National,
Northeast, Northwest and Western.

42Southwest-Northeast Case, Dkt. 2355, (Order Serial No. E-9758), November 21, 1955. CCII Aviation Law Reporter, Paragraph 21,892.
43 Other cases in this "series": New York-Chicago Service Case, Dkt. 986,
(Order Serial No. E-9537), September 1, 1955. CCH Aviation Law Reporter, Paragraphs 21,865, 21,876. Denver Service Case, Dkt. 1841, (Order Serial No. E-9735),
November 14, 1955. CCH Aviation Law Reporter, Paragraphs 21,877, 21,917. New
York-Florida Service Case, Dkt. 3051, (Order Serial No. E-10645), September 28,
1956. CCH Aviation Law Reporter, Paragraph 21,993. Florida-TexasService Case,
Dkt. 5701, (Order Serial No. E-10635), September 21, 1956. CCH Aviation Law
Reporter, Paragraph 21,992.
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In addition to the considerations cited above for the Southwest-Northeast Case, the Board in this decision also made two other noteworthy
observations having particularly important implications as to its policy
with respect to the extension of competition between trunk carriers
of diverse sizes. First, the financing and costly operational problems
to be faced by the smaller trunks as they enter into the re-equipment
program necessary to compete in the jet era were cited as further
reasons to reduce the size and "opportunity" disparity between them
and their larger brethren. 44 Secondly, the question of the diversion of
revenue was relegated to a subordinate role in determining the need
for and choice of a competing carrier, largely because "we (the Board)
are no longer faced with the problem of heavy subsidy support for our
trunkline carriers-which was a factor which necessarily inhibited the
award of competitive services and, at an earlier date, made the question
45
of diversion of particular importance."
It may be of more than passing interest to note the line of development of the Board's recent viewpoint towards competition between
trunkline carriers of greatly different size as expressed in this series of
cases. In the New York-Chicago Service Case the Board seemed to be
feeling its way along, not quite certain if it were laying down a strong
general policy for itself or not. This decision is characterized by statements of the following sort:
"We believe that the services we are authorizing for Capital are
typical of the kind of service especially suitable for operation by a
regional carrier, and will contribute substantially to the strengthening of Capital's system, an objective which we consider of great
importance in perfecting the route structure of the nation ...
Capital . . . is not one of the larger trunkline carriers . . . and

requires additional opportunity for growth in order to insure that
it will remain on a subsidy-free basis . ..Capital has a greater
need than the other applicants .... While the Civil Aeronautics Act
seeks the development of a sound national system, and not the
advantage of an individual carrier as such, we find that this case
is one where the strenigthening of an individual carrier is required
for the sound development of the national system of which it is a
part."
The strengthening of the individual carrier seems to have high
44 The recognition of the financial difficulties possibly to result from the inauguration of jet-age operations (as in the Northeast-Southwest Case) may appear hard
to reconcile with the Board's later turn-down of the airlines' plea for a 6% fare
increase. Actually, the two expressions of the Board's attitude might be reconciled
if it believes that a fare increase would now drive away passengers to such an
extent that profits would be lowered. (This would mean, in economic terms, that
the price elasticity of demand for air transportation service was seen to be elastic
in the range of prices under consideration.) In fact, the Board has not made this
observation explicitly.
45 Possibly to assure that no one mistook its statement on diversion to mean
it was relaxing (or discarding) this criterion to the extent, say, of permitting
much freer entry on heavily travelled routes, the Board quickly added that ".

.

. this

does not mean, of course, that we are now free to authorize unlimited competition,
for an excess of competition can bring uneconomic conditions and jeopardize the
development of that sound system of air transportation which is the ultimate
objective of the Act."
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priority in this proceeding while the remodeling of the air transportation system has not yet loomed so large.
In the second of these cases, the Denver Service Case, much the
same in tone, although the language is perhaps a bit more broad in
its sweep:
"Some of the major benefits resulting from sound competition are
increased frequency of service, improved service, choice of equipment, choice of carrier, data available to a state and greater generation of traffic ...United and TWA have consistently done a better
job in developing traffic under the stimulus of competition than
they have while operating under monopoly conditions."
And with respect to the two smaller trunklines awarded extensions

in the decision:
"... Western is the smallest of the non-subsidized trunk lines and
its award of this route would strengthen its regional system. Western provides air service to a number of small communities which
produce less revenue than the expenses involved in serving them.
It is obvious . . . that the vast majority of Western revenues are

derived from a few high-density routes which must subsidize the
unprofitable services to the small communities. .

.

. Continental's

lack of size is demonstrated by the fact that it is the only trunkline
carrier which does not serve one of the leading 100 passenger-mile
markets. In revenue ton-miles flown it carries less than one per cent
of the trunkline total, and its total non-mail operating revenues
amount to only 1.19 per cent of the industry total. In traffic density
per route mile, Continental ranks lowest among the domestic trunk
lines, and it also has the shortest average length of passenger haul
of any of the applicants in this proceeding. The extension of Continental's route from Denver to Los Angeles and from Kansas City
to Chicago, would for the first time, give it access to the high
density travel market."
In the third case, the Southwest-Northeast Service Case, the Board
at the outset declares its basic objective to be most general:
"This case is the third in a series of major area route cases in
which the Board is reappraising important portions of the national
air route structure."
The decision further goes on to say, as noted above "It is vital, in our opinion, to so develop the national air route
structure as to tend to decrease rather than increase the gap between the relative size of the Big Four carriers and the smaller
trunks.... Our objective is so to strengthen the smaller trunks as
to insure that they will in the future be able to continue operations
without subsidy even during periods of economic adversity .... We

cannot ignore the fact that substantial route awards to the larger
carriers would tend to create greater unbalance in carrier size,
and thereby adversely affect the ability of the smaller trunks to
compete effectively in markets which they jointly serve with the
larger carriers. We believe the benefits to be derived from effective
competition will be spread to a greater number of cities if the size
disparity between the smaller and larger carriers is reduced."
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The next two decisions in this series of cases that now stand at five
were the Florida-Texas Service Case and the New York-Florida Case.
These decisions have served largely to echo the sentiments expressed in
the statements in the earlier cases as just outlined.
With respect to direct, major competition between two or more
of the smaller trunklines, the Board has seemed reluctant to authorize
such duplication of services except upon fairly strong showing that
the resulting diversion will be small and will not affect the paralleled
carrier in any seriously detrimental way.46 The Board may also permit
duplication of service by two smaller trunklines where the duplication
occurs only over a comparatively small portion of one or both carriers'
total long-haul routes and where the duplication is necessary to afford
47
both entry to the primary long-haul markets of the country.
In short, the Board permits competition between smaller trunklines
to materialize only where the routes are seen by it to be strong enough
to support the operations of all franchised carriers or where such competition emerges as a result of some other objective of the Board which
inevitably results in such duplicated service.
Finally, it is necessary to examine the Board's attitude with respect
to competition between Big Four carriers in the post-war period. Immediately after the war and for some time thereafter the Board was
confronted with the problem of permitting Big Four carriers to compete with each other only over a comparatively few heavily travelled
long-haul routes, usually a part of a transcontinental route one or more
of them already had in one form or another. While taking into account
such "conventional" factors as the public convenience issues, the profitability of the route, the need for "realignment" of an applicant's
route structure, etc., the selection of a carrier, where the traffic was
thought to warrant such new competition, was generally correlated
quite closely with the magnitude of the additional cost to the government (or reduction of such cost) in the form of subsidy which would
result from the award. In reality, the Board's actions placing Big Four
carriers in direct competition with each other from the time when the
"grandfather" certificates were issued until the 1950's, almost always
took the form of permitting non-stop operations between points already served on a given route, but not on a non-stop basis. 48 In other
46 For example, in the New York-Florida Case, Northeast Airlines and National
Airlines were placed in competition with each other (and with Eastern Air Lines)

after a finding that the route could support all the carriers adequately. See also
New York-Chicago Case. Frequently a long-haul restriction will be placed on one
or more of the competing carriers, partially to assure the "proper" competitive
balance between them over a route. This was true in the award to Northwest Airlines of a Chicago-New York segment in the New York-Chicago Case.
47 An illustration of this would be the Southwest-Northeast Service Case in
which Braniff Airways, Delta Air Lines, and Capital Airlines were placed in competition with other carriers and themselves between various points, including New
York and Washington and intermediate cities.
48 For example, prior to the decision in American Airlines, Inc., et al., Consolidation of Routes, (1946) (7 CAB 337), both American Airlines and United
Airlines had coast-to-coast routes, although they differed in the requirements for
stopping en route between various cities. In this proceeding, the Board permitted
the "consolidation" of certain of these carriers' routes so as to permit new non-stop

REGULATION OF COMPETITION

words, almost without exception no Big Four carrier in this period
received an entirely new route or major route extension which placed
that carrier in direct competition with another Big Four carrier.
In the recent past the Board has continued to inaugurate new competing Big Four service largely by permitting existing routes to be
consolidated or by authorizing non-stop flights to be made between

cities where intermediate stops had previously been required. There
are, however, two particularly noteworthy exceptions to these methods
of putting Big Four carriers into new competition with each other.
First, in the Reopened Milwaukee-Chicago-New York Restriction
Case,49 the Board established TWA as an additional carrier (to United
among the Big Four) providing non-stop service between New York
and Cleveland, subject to a long-haul restriction.
In its decision the Board said:
"... we find that additional New York-Cleveland non-stop service
should be authorized, subject to a long-haul restriction and that
TWA should be selected to provide the additional service. Our
action herein is motivated in large part by the need demonstrated
on this record for improved service between Cleveland and Western
points, and for improvement of TWA's route pattern."50

This emphasized language with reference to a Big Four carrier is
notable for its uniqueness at this stage in the development of the
United States air transportation system. Such a remark with reference
to a Big Four operator has seldom been found in Board decisions in
recent years. It is not clear just what significance it has for the
future of our certificated air transportation network. Suffice it to say
that not since this decision has the Board explicitly stated it was granting a new or enlarged authority to a Big Four carrier in order to
improve its route pattern.5
services which placed them in more direct competition with each other. (In so
doing the Board cited, among other things, "improvements of schedules and operating efficiency," and "administration savings.") Also, as a result of this proceeding, American, the only carrier up to that time with non-stop Chicago-Washington
authorization was duplicated in such service by Capital, United, and TWA. The
technique used was to permit route "consolidation" and the latter two carriers were
subjected to long-haul restrictions on such flights. Again, in this decision TWA
and United were placed in competition with each other in Chicago-Boston non-stop
service through the same device-also with long-haul restrictions applying to both
authorizations.
In the decision United Air Lines, Inc., Detroit-New York and Detroit-Allentown Non-Stop Operations, (1947) (7 CAB 781), the Board authorized United to
parallel American's non-stop Detroit-New York service by eliminating the requirement to make stops between the two cities.
49 Reopened Milwaukee-Chicago-New York Restoration Case (Cleveland-New
York Non-stop Service) : Dkt. No. 1789, et al., (Order Serial No. E-9538), September 1, 1955, CCH Aviation Law Reporter, Paragraph 21,866.
50 Italics added.
51 The author believes it is a different thing for the Board to grant a Big Four
carrier a substantial new segment for the purpose (in part) of improving its
routes (as in this extension of TWA from Cleveland to New York) than it is for
the Board to grant new authority to a Big Four carrier in order that it may better
be able to compete with another Big Four carrier for long-haul traffic. An illustration of the latter is to be found in the New York-Florida Case where United and
TWA were permitted to serve Boston, New York and Washington (and intermediate points between) on the same flight pursuant to a rather severe long-haul
restriction. The purpose of this grant was to afford the carriers ".

.

. the ability
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The second recent major exception to the general Board policy
and method with regard to authorizing or permitting new competition
between Big Four carriers is to be found in two parts of its decision
in the Denver Service Case. In one part American Airlines was granted
a substantial extension to its routes in order to permit it to offer competitive non-stop service to United and TWA between Chicago and
San Francisco/Oakland. In making the award the Board said:
"... this market is of sufficient size and importance to justify an
effective service by a third transcontinental carrier .... We will

therefore authorize American to operate directly between Chicago
and San Francisco/Oakland .... We are cognizant that this action

will give American entry into a highly lucrative market, and that
this carrier's vigorous participation will result in substantial diversion from United and TWA. Nonetheless, we find that the public
need for this additional competitive service and the benefits that
will flow therefrom outweigh the factor of diversion from other
carriers."
Also in the Denver Service Case, the Board, in adding Denver to
TWA's transcontinental routes and Kansas City to United's transcontinental routes created additional competition between these Big Four
Carriers over a number of new segments. Prior to this decision Denver
and Kansas City were the private preserves of United and TWA respectively, as far as transcontinental traffic was concerned. They had
no transcontinental competition at either of these points to which
they offered service.
In putting each of these Big Four carriers into the stronghold of
the other, the Board found that each of the two points needed and
deserved competitive transcontinental service to afford the cities more
one-plane service to more points, to stimulate growth of coach services,
to make possible more frequent and more convenient schedules to the
large coastal cities to the east and west, etc. No promotional objective
is made evident insofar as the specific strengthening of one or the other
of the carriers' route structures is concerned.5 2
to combine traffic to and from major east coast cities (which) will better enable
United and TWA to provide the increased frequencies of service necessary to
satisfy the cities' long-haul needs, as well as (enable them to) compete more effec-

tively with American for such traffic."

In short, the potential impact upon the air transportation system and industry
is very different if the Board intends to continue "improving" even Big Four car-

riers' routes than it is if the criteria for route extension of these carriers is on
other more basic, and less promotional grounds.
52 In granting the United and TWA awards, the Board took care to minimize

the diversionary effects of the new Big Four service on the smaller, regional trunk-

lines serving the area by placing restrictions on each of the carriers' new services
into Denver and Kansas City. But with respect to the diversionary effect upon each
other of these "mirror image" authorization, the Board stated...it is clear that United's services will have no substantial adverse

effect upon TWA, since TWA's diversion from United at Denver and
United's diversion from TWA at Kansas City tend to offset each other."
This is a most curious statement in that it stands alone, without any substantiation at all of the notion that the diversionary effects would be cancelling. Of
course, this might well be the case as far as the number of passengers to be carried
(or passenger-miles produced) is concerned. But the effects on net income might

be far different as a result of the added costs incurred in providing service to an
additional community. The increase in fixed (station, promotional, etc.), costs is

REGULATION OF COMPETITION

The contrast is quite evident between the words and rationalizations employed in the Denver Service Case with respect to the Big Four
authorizations and those used in giving TWA non-stop authority
between New York and Cleveland. In the former case there is present
the strong implication that the Board is really not too concerned about
revenue diversions from any of the Big Four carriers in view of their
self-sufficient position at that time.
The implication in this respect in the Denver Service Case is more
explicitly recognized in other recent decisions of the Board in which
competition between Big Four carriers has been introduced or substantially changed by means of the granting of non-stop authority or by
permitting a consolidation of existing routes. In the Louisville-New
York Non-Stop Investigationj the Board, after deciding that non-stop
service between the two points was required and justified, the Board
decided to permit all three Big Four applicants (American, Eastern
and TWA), to offer the non-stop service. It did so in the following
words:
"Each of the carriers here involved has been economically selfsufficient for many years, and each has a strong and lucrative route
pattern developing substantial volumes of traffic. Therefore, there
is no longer any need for protecting any one of these carriers from
the competition of the other in their market. .

.

. To grant only one

of the carriers such (non-stop) authority would disrupt the present
competitive balance wherein each carrier is in a position to provide
Louisville-New York service with one stop. Since the economics
of the situation now appear to justify non-stop operation in this
area, we conclude that each carrier should be placed on an equally
competitive footing ....
55
Again, in its decisions in Tucson Airport Authority and the East50
ern Route Consolidation Case, the Board made route awards placing
Big Four carriers in competition with one another without specifically
mentioning the strengthening of the routes of any such carrier as an
objective. In the first of these cases the Board gave as its reasons for
placing TWA into Tucson alongside American ". . . the (impressive)

fairly obvious, given the reasonable assumption that no decrease in such costs will
occur at the "old" station. (Indeed, at least the promotional type of cost could be
expected to rise at the "old" station with the advent of the new competition.) Less
obvious, but nonetheless reasonably to be expected are the increased costs arising
from the increased aircraft time and operating expenses associated therewith which
arise from the necessity to add another point to the system and the schedule.

The Board's apparent lack of understanding of these relationships between

costs and revenues is somewhat surprising.
53 Louisville-New York Non-Stop Investigation, Dkt. No. 7253); (Order No.
E-9540) September 1, 1955, CCH Aviation Law Reporter, Paragraph 21,868.
54 It is interesting to note in passing that in the Louisville-New York Non-Stop
Investigation the Board refers to TWA's route pattern as being "strong and lucrative" while in the Reopened Milwaukee-Chicago-New York Restriction Case it
grants TWA a substantial addition to its system in order to afford it needed "improvement in its route pattern." The contrast between these two views of TWA's
position in the industry is heightened by the fact that both of the decisions referred
to were issued on the same day.
55 Tucson Airport Authority, Dkt. No. 5564, (Order No. E-10487), July 27,
1956, CCH Aviation Law Reporter, Paragraph 21,977.
56 Eastern Route Consolidation Case, Dkt. No. 3292, et al.: (Order No.
E-11184), April 1, 1957, CCH Aviation Law Reporter, Paragraph 22,037.
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improvements in air service which will flow from TWA's service" such
as greatly increased one-carrier service to other cities, the availability
of substantially more tourist service, the lowering of fares to certain
points through less circuitous routings, and, finally, the provision of
competitive schedules which "will help develop additional traffic for
Tucson." With respect to diverson of revenues from American, the
Board held that "whatever actual reduction in revenues may be experienced ... will not seriously affect that carrier, and will be justified by
the benefits accruing to the travelling public."
In the second case the Board expresses its feelings in much the same
way while granting, in effect, non-stop authority to two Big Four
carriers who will be competing with a third such carrier"... the equalization of competitive opportunity holds the greatest
prospect, in our estimation, for the development of this segment's
ultimate traffic potential. The proper competitive spur can be provided by authorizing both Eastern and American to serve more
effectively a route which they are both already serving."
Once again the Board is introducing competition in order to provide the public with a better service rather than to strengthen routes.
Also, the Board again seems to feel that with the Big Four financially
independent of the public treasury, it can put such carriers into
competition with each other much more freely than it formerly could
and much more freely than it still can introduce competition when
any other class of carrier is concerned.57 It remains to be seen if the
Board will carry its present doctrine to its ultimate conclusion. If so,
it may be expected to begin creating competition for its own sake any
time government support is not seen to be required by the carriers
involved.
In the following sections of this paper certain specific problems
which have faced the Board will be discussed in order to gain further
insight into its changing attitudes toward competition and its use to
foster development of the United States air transportation system.
Problem areas to be considered include airline merger and acquisition
of control, price and service competition, and the non-scheduled airline question.
57 In the Eastern Route Consolidation Case the Board used this sort of language on this point: "We recognize that the addition of two carriers to this market

will have a diversionary effect upon TWA. It should not . . . however . . . impair

TWA's ability to conduct its operation economically and profitably. . . . Surely
there is no question here of needing protection for Eastern, for that carrier is

fully capable of withstanding the diversion that will result from the competitive
service."

